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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Putin stumbles over free press 
It's amazing how quickly circumstances can change. After "dizzying successes" 
in domestic policy proposals and a strong start to foreign appearances, President 
Putin was tripped up by a far from unexpected arrest. Vladimir Gusinsky, the now 
out-of-favor oligarch, whose media outlets have been the most skeptical 
observers of government policy in Chechnya and on a range of other issues, was 
detained for questioning in a fraud investigation that has kept the central suspect 
in jail for two years without charge. Within days, a heretofore compliant elite 
political leadership turned on the administration, sensing division within the 
Kremlin's ruling apparat, and diverse variety of journalists, financiers and 
politicians joined to protest the arrest and its possible chilling effect on freedom of 
the press and the free market. 
 
Most astonishing of all reactions to Gusinsky's arrest was the President's. "This is 
a dubious gift," Putin claimed from Madrid. (VEDOMOSTI, 15 Jun 00, via lexis-
nexis) He followed his apparently surprised reaction with an unbelievable claim 
that he had not been able to contact his chief law enforcement official. He later 
described the arrest as "excessive" and recognized Gusinsky's claims to 
amnesty based on a dubious state award to the oligarch for service to the 
Russian Government. (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 8:10 PDT, 16 Jun 00; C-
afp@clari.net) Gusinsky has since been released from custody, after giving a 
personal guarantee that he will remain in Moscow, but lingering questions on the 
decision to arrest him, particularly who made the decision and who knew of it, 
raise doubts about Putin's control over his administration. 
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Kremlin Chief of Staff Aleksandr Voloshin has been targeted as the main culprit 
in this story. As head of the Kremlin apparat, holdover and liaison with the 
Yel'tsin regime, Voloshin carries the baggage of resentment for the "Family" 
interests of the Yel'tsin years. Voloshin also represents the process by which 
Putin came to power, which was almost certainly a "Family" plan. The Gusinsky 
arrest focuses attention, uncomfortably for those in power, on the doubts over 
Putin's ascent to office and who is really in charge in the Kremlin. 
 
While there is conflicting information about the origin of the decision to arrest the 
Media-MOST chief, Putin has done little to mitigate the damage to his reputation. 
Indeed, his implausible denials of foreknowledge or ability to influence the 
Procurator-General have weakened him domestically. Putin's mention of the 
Procurator-General may suggest a clumsy attempt to create a scapegoat should 
the political need arise. It was widely rumored at the time of his nomination that 
Vladimir Ustinov was Voloshin's choice as Procurator, and that he was put 
forward in place of Putin's choice, Dmitri Kozak. Ustinov's ties to Boris 
Berezovsky and other member's of Yel'tsin's Family revealed Putin's continued 
reliance on the previous administration, and Putin may wish to distance himself 
from that image by laying a political mess at his feet. This incident however, does 
little to clarify the level of authority Putin is able to wield. Gusinsky certainly 
believes the President was actively involved in the matter, he claims that Putin, 
not Voloshin, made the decision to have him arrested. (NEW YORK TIMES, 21 
Jun 00; via nytimes.com) 
 
Within the apparat, the Gusinsky arrest has demonstrated the uncertainty of 
loyalties in Putin's recent appointments to his administration. Some have 
suggested that the Kremlin is currently witnessing a clash of old guard Yel'tsin 
team members with newer Putin appointees. There may also be a division 
between bureaucrats and security service personnel. Central to the resolution of 
this question is the relationship between Putin and Voloshin. Despite media 
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speculation, Putin has retained him as Chief of Staff. That may indicate trust or 
dependence.  
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
New Membership and new role? 
If Putin feels the need for a counterweight to the administration, he will likely turn 
to the Security Council, which is supervised by his close associate, Sergei 
Ivanov. Putin's decision to add his regional representatives to the Council 
certainly has heightened its profile. 
 
The current membership is as follows: President Putin as Chairman; Sergei 
Ivanov as Secretary; Prime Minister Kasyanov; Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov; 
Defense Minister Sergeyev; FSB Director Patrushev; Aleksandr Voloshin; Duma 
Speaker Seleznev; Federation Council head Stroyev; MVD Chief Rushailo; 
Prosecutor-General Ustinov; Justice Minister Chaika; Emergencies Minister 
Shoigu; FAPSI head Vladimir Matyukhin; SVR Chief Sergei Lebedev; Border 
Guards head Konstantin Totsky; President of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
Yuri Osipov; and the seven regional representatives, Georgi Poltavchenko, Viktor 
Kazantsev, Leonid Drachevsky, Viktor Cherkesov; Konstantin Pulikovsky, Sergei 
Kiriyenko and Petr Latyshev. (INTERFAX, 1723 GMT, 27 May 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
REPRESENTATIVES 
New Regional bosses 
President Putin's decision to superimpose seven federally-managed districts 
across the Russian state structure assumed a grim aspect as he unveiled his 
choices to head each region. Most have military or security services 
backgrounds, at least one, Viktor Cherkesov gained notoriety for his zealous 
persecution of dissidents. The level of concern with the President's plan was 
voiced by Boris Pustintsev, himself a former dissident, "The country is now being 
run by a Latin American-style junta." (SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, 21 May 00 via 
Nexis) 
 4 
 
The appointments were not uniformly ominous however, former Prime Minister 
Sergei Kiriyenko, who is a noted liberal politician, was named to head the Volga 
region. While the President has proposed vesting his representatives with 
sweeping authority, the parliament is still debating elements of the bill that would 
enshrine their powers. The debate also involves reform of the upper house of the 
parliament, and particularly removing the immunity privileges enjoyed by 
Governors. During a meeting of the Federation Council, the Presidential envoy to 
the chamber provoked angry outbursts with his claim that if immunity were 
removed, some of the current MPs would soon be behind bars. The Procurator-
General, who was also present, calmed the Governors with his reassurances that 
there were no cases pending against any of them. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 08 
Jun 00; FBIS-SOV-20000608 via World News Connection) 
 
One element of the President's proposal has passed the Duma. Governors will 
no longer have input into the appointment of police officials. The new measure 
grants the Ministry for Internal Affairs the right to fire local police chiefs. 
(AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 21 Jun 00, 3:30 PDT; via C-afp@clari.net) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
Although both Moscow and Washington have denied reports that Russia is 
seeking to ease Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic into a comfortable 
retirement, such a scenario fits neatly with Moscow's recent campaigns to 
promote itself as a reliable guarantor of European security against a post-Cold 
War threat of "international terrorism" and to highlight American failures to 
address European problems. 
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If, as reported, the White House has sought Russia's help in smoothing 
Milosevic's removal, the Clinton Administration has played into Moscow's efforts 
to secure a self-serving reputation. Vladimir Putin would like nothing more than 
for Russia to win a name as a bulwark of European values in an unstable world, 
since he could use -- and already has used-- such an image as a rebuke of the 
United States, portrayed in contrast as dangerously naïve. 
 
Slavic Solidarity 
Is Moscow working behind the scenes to guarantee Milosevic a safe European 
home? According to The New York Times, U.S. President Bill Clinton has asked 
Russian president Vladimir Putin to help ensure that Milosevic "be allowed to 
leave office with guarantees for his safety and his savings." Clinton reportedly 
asked for Putin's help in guaranteeing Milosevic's safe exit from power during 
their summit in early June. (NEW YORK TIMES, 19 June 00; via 
www.nytimes.com). 
 
Unfortunately, such an American gambit -- if real -- would come at a time when 
Putin's Kremlin is pursuing influence in Belgrade at the United States's expense. 
 
In a trip remarkable for its secrecy and effrontery to the West, Yugoslav Defense 
Minister Dragoljub Ojdanic visited Moscow for nearly a week in early May. 
Although the indicted war criminal took part in Moscow's May 9th celebration of 
the defeat of Nazi Germany and was welcomed by Russia's Defense and Foreign 
Ministries, his visit was not reported by Russian media or acknowledged by the 
Russian government until nearly a week after he left. 
 
When the U.S. State Department protested that the United Nations held Ojdanic 
responsible for persecution of Kosovo Albanians, an anonymous source in the 
Russian Foreign Minister replied that Moscow believed such indictments to be 
"politically motivated" and therefore unworthy of enforcement. (INTERFAX, 1107 
GMT, 17 May 00; FBIS-EEU-2000-0517, via World News Connection). It was not 
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for another week that Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov backpedaled slightly, 
claiming Ojdanic's reception, although spread among top officials of two major 
ministries, had been the result of an administrative mistake. (INTERFAX, 1731 
GMT, 24 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0524, via World News Connection). 
 
Moscow was more forthcoming about visits by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin 
Jovanovic, affording Belgrade's emissary a long interview in the government's 
newspaper, Rossiyskaya Gazeta and talks with Ivanov. In his interview, 
Jovanovic claimed that troops representing the United Nations in Kosovo were 
consciously allowing "terror, organized crime, smuggling and prostitution" to 
flourish in the province as a means to destabilize the Balkans and justify Western 
military activity in the Balkans. 
 
Jovanovic also explicitly equated the separatist threat in Kosovo and in 
Chechnya, and claimed that the West was fomenting terrorism to its peril. 
"Brussels and Washington," he said, "do not realize that those who help terrorists 
and separatists, such as [former Kosovo Liberation Army comander Hashim] 
Thaci, [Former KLA commander Agim] Ceku, [Chechen president Aslan] 
Maskhadov and others, are opening a "Pandora's box" they should not be 
surprised at the "reverse effect" such as in Riyadh, Cairo, New York, Corsica, 
Bilbao, Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam, and so forth." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 16 
May 00; FBIS-EEU-2000-0516; via World News Connection). 
 
These moves towards Belgrade served Moscow's interests in two ways: they 
helped to discredit NATO's efforts to hold the Milosevic responsible for the 
debacles of Yugoslavia's collapse while also positioning Moscow as defender of 
"civilized" interests in Europe. If Moscow can later claim a role in easing 
Milosevic from power, it will have burnished its reputation for effective diplomacy 
even as it savages the United States for disrupting European stability. 
 
A flat summit 
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Moscow has already shown how it plans to use the contrast of alleged American 
recklessness and Russian sophistication. During and following the summit in 
which Clinton's secret proposal was allegedly made, Putin contrasted America's 
"destabilizing" proposals for amending the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with 
Russia's safer "pan-European" system of defense. 
 
Clinton arrived to promote a defense compromise that Russia had ruled out in 
advance. In exchange for amendments to the ABM Treaty that would allow 
construction of a limited, land-based missile defense system, the United States 
would agree to cut its stock of intercontinental missiles to levels proposed under 
START III. But the Russians knew what pitch was coming, and were able to 
knock it out of the park. Rejecting Clinton's plan on the eve of their summit, Putin 
instead proposed a pan-European system, jointly developed by European, 
Russian and American scientists, probably based on Russian soil, of a missile 
defense that would intercept missiles in their "boost phase." (ITAR-TASS, 0854 
GMT, 2 June 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0602; via World News Connection). 
 
On lightening trips to Rome and Berlin immediately following the summit, Putin 
hinted that the United States can not be trusted with European security 
questions. "It is very important," Putin said in Berlin, "that European states should 
speak out for the preservation of the US-Russian ABM Treaty thereby 
strengthening strategic stability in the world." Threatening to withdraw from 
START II if the U.S. abandoned the ABM treaty, Putin said the American plans 
are "tantamount to a proposal 'to burn the house in order to cook an omelette'." 
(INTERFAX, 1959 GMT, 10 June 00; FBIS-WEU-2000-0611, via World News 
Connection). 
 
Taken together with Moscow's insistent claims that last year's Kosovo campaign 
failed, a Russian foreign policy position for Europe emerges. The Kremlin 
appears to hope that it can portray Washington's plans for missile defense as 
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another the disruptive American "scheme," one as risky and unsettling as its 
Kosovo campaign. 
 
So far, the ploy appears to be working, weakening the American position among 
its NATO allies. Ernst-Jorg von Studnitz, German Ambassador to Russia, stated 
that Germany shared Putin's concerns about America's plans to establish its own 
missile defense system. "Berlin understands that in this case, the matter 
concerns the security of only one of the partners [the U.S.], whereas Germany 
has been talking of joint actions for many years," von Studnitz said. "We should 
find solutions in the ABM sphere which would meet all our needs." (INTERFAX, 
1414 GMT, 6 June 00; FBIS-WEU-2000-0606, via World News Connection). 
 
Nationality, Autocracy and Urbanity 
If Moscow can court Belgrade while pushing for reform in rump Yugoslavia, 
Russia can rehabilitate its own reputation as well. Milosevic could be made a 
scapegoat, accused of over-reacting to a genuine "terrorist" threat; Moscow 
could push for his replacement and win over a new generation of Serbian 
leaders. The Kremlin could also make the case that its own experience of 
"fighting terrorism" in Chechnya, far from an embarrassment, ought instead to 
grant it a privileged position as a defender of European civilization. 
 
This vision of Russia's new role would match the one political principle that Putin 
appears to hold dear -- defense and advancement of the ethnic "Russian" nation. 
A European-wide antiballistic missile system more suited to Moscow's interests 
than the U.S. scheme could then be promoted as a Russian contribution to a 
continent threatened by "terrorists" that Washington does not take seriously and, 
in the case of Kosovo, has even abetted. It is still unclear whether European 
leaders would buy a Russian claim to be a defender of their Eastern frontier. But 
as Kosovo roils and Washington provides no persuasive "Atlantic" vision of 
European security, Putin's case is certainly a lot easier to make. 
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Moscow summit shakes up Russo-Chinese relations 
Russia and China have long seen eye to eye on ABM and NMD, but Putin's 
actions at the Moscow summit with President Clinton in early June seem to have 
shaken the united posture that Russia and China have embraced over the past 
eighteen months. Although it is still to early to assess the impact, if any, that the 
summit will have on broader Russo-Chinese relations, Putin's post-summit 
actions seem to hint that he is well aware of his misstep. 
 
Only days after his Moscow summit with Clinton, Putin phoned Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin to reiterate Russia's commitment to the Russo-Chinese 
strategic partnership. Although he probably didn't mean for it to sound like an 
admission of guilt, Putin's pledge to Jiang that Russia is "ready to enhance 
coordination and cooperation with China on major issues of international strategy 
and stability" sounded like an "I'm sorry." (XINHUA, 1154 GMT, 8 Jun 00; FBIS-
EAS-2000-0608, via World News Connection) Putin will have an opportunity to 
address the issue in person with Jiang during a brief Beijing stopover on his way 
to the Okinawa G-8 summit in July. For added measure, the Russian Foreign 
Ministry has confirmed that Putin will most likely stop in Pyongyang as well in an 
attempt to dispel western fears of a North Korean rogue threat. It appears that 
Putin is hoping that these measures might allay Chinese fears that he is 
wavering on ABM. However, Putin has yet to match his rhetoric with action, and 
the Chinese are well aware of it. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Media 
By Jonathan Solomon 
 
Gusinsky Arrested 
On the evening of 13 June, chairman of the Media-MOST group Vladimir 
Gusinsky was supposedly called in by investigators from the Prosecutor 
General's Office to explain why he `kept ammunition on hand for a firearm that he 
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had received as an award.' After arriving at the office, he was summarily arrested 
for a completely different offence. Gusinsky was charged under Article 159 of the 
Russian Federation Criminal Code, as he stands accused of defrauding the 
government during the 1998 privatization of a video production firm called 
Russkoye Video. (INTERFAX, 1536 GMT, 13 Jun 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0613, via 
World News Connection) 
 
The Prosecutor General's Office has alleged that when Media-MOST acquired 
the former state asset, Gusinsky bribed Dmitry Rozhdestvensky, Rosskoye's 
general director, to allow MOST to acquire 70% of the company's shares for only 
$5000. Rozhdestvensky has been in prison for nearly two years awaiting trial on 
charges of misappropriating state funds and property in an unrelated case. 
MOST spokesman Dmitry Ostalsky denied that the group or Gusinsky had 
played any part in Russkoye's privatization, stating that it "had been privatized 
long before it became Media-MOST's partner." (MOSCOW TIMES, 15 Jun 00; 
via www.themoscowtimes.com) 
 
The Elites React 
Reaction to Gusinsky's arrest was immediate. MOST officials avoided blaming 
Putin and instead accused Presidential Chief of Staff Alexander Voloshin and 
other "family" figures aligned with Gusinsky's rival, Boris Berezovsky. Gusinsky's 
chief deputy, Igor Malashenko, flew to Madrid to attempt to hold a press 
conference from the lobby of the Ritz Hotel in which Putin was staying during his 
visit to Spain. He was barred by Presidential security from doing so, but 
managed to meet with the press at the nearby Palace Hotel. As an interesting 
side note, for the first 25 minutes of the press conference, the lights mysteriously 
lost power until "it became clear that the press conference would go ahead." 
(Moskovsky Komsomolets, 15 Jun 00, pp. 1-2; Agency WPS- What the Papers 
Say, via Lexis-Nexis) Malashenko declared that the Berezovsky-Voloshin bloc's 
goal was to "build an authoritarian regime in Russia, " and to that end have 
begun "a war against independent media." Putin, according to Malashenko, is a 
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"hostage" of these men, as they brought him to power, and now he is trying to 
free himself from their control. (MOSCOW TIMES, 15 Jun 00; via 
www.themoscowtimes.com) 
 
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, whose Fatherland-All Russia party was supported 
by Gusinsky's media assets in last December's Duma elections, also accused 
Voloshin, saying that the affair was "a test of society's reaction to repressions." 
He demanded Gusinsky's release, and offered to take his place in prison if 
Gusinsky fled the country. 
 
In a joint statement by Fatherland-All Russia, Yabloko, the Union of Right Forces 
(SPS), and the Russia's regions party, the blocs demanded Gusinsky be 
released and requested that Putin explain hmself: "We have no grounds not to 
believe Putin when he says he had not knownabout preparations for the arrest... 
but then another question arises: who is interested in splitting society exactly at 
the time when the president of Russia is carrying out such important reforms?" 
The blocs' leaders later told reporters that they may reconsider supporting Putin's 
bills on tax and federal structural reform when they reach the Duma floor. 
 
Eduard Sagalayev, president of the National Association of Broadcasters, was 
more hostile. Noting that in the prior incidents, ranging from assaults against 
journalists to the raiding of Media MOST facilities by federal agents last month, 
his organization had given Putin the benefit of the doubt in his role in these 
repressions, "what happens now changes the picture radically." He went on to 
say that "Gusinsky's arrest removes the veil of ambiguity from the actions of the 
authorities. It is absolutely clear that they are trying to throw us back to a society 
in which political liberties and dissidence are considered a punishable crime." 
(MOSCOW TIMES, 15 Jun 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) 
 
UES Chairman Anatoly Chubays considered the arrest a grave mistake, 
observing that it would signal repression of freedom of the press and thus serve 
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to dissuade foreign investment in Russia. He also said that Putin had not 
mentioned any plans to arrest Gusinsky when the two had met the day before. "I 
can assume that such decisions are made at a low level by overzealous 
underlings of big wheels, said Chubays, who also hinted that Putin should not let 
decisions with such political ramifications be made at levels as low as the 
Prosecutor General's Office. (INTERFAX, 1342 GMT, 14 Jun 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0614, via World News Connection) 
 
Seventeen Russian businessmen (including a few of the `lesser' oligarchs) 
published an open letter condemning the arrest. Among the signers were 
Chubays, Gazprom head Rem Vyakhirev, Alfa Bank President Pyotr Aven, and 
Interros holding company head Vladimir Potanin, whose firm has a 51% share in 
Izvestia newspaper. "Until yesterday we believed that we lived in a democratic 
country," scolded the letter. "Today we have serious doubts." (MOSCOW TIMES, 
15 Jun 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) Indeed, what prompted the letter is no 
doubt that many of the signers see themselves potentially in Gusinsky's shoes 
down the road. 
 
Mikhail Gorbachev went on record to say that the arrest was a continuation of 
repressions against the free press that began with the federal raids on MOST 
offices last month, as well as "an attempt to frighten the media and society." 
Commenting on Gusinsky's incarceration in Moscow's notorious, overcrowded 
Butyrka prison for common criminals, Gorbachev noted that it "smacks of 
vengeance, to say the least," and that it "was pure politics." But, he also 
suggested that it was a move made by subordinates against Putin, meant to 
embarass the president while he was abroad. (INTERFAX, 0627 GMT, 14 Jun 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0614, via World News Connection) 
 
As for Putin's reaction from Madrid and Berlin, where he was conveniently out of 
town engaged in talks aimed at increasing Western investment in Russia, he at 
first expressed mild surprise at the arrest. "It was a dubious present [for me]... I 
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hope the security forces have sufficient grounds to make such an action and it 
has been done according to the law," he was quoted as saying to reporters in his 
`close circle. (MOSCOW TIMES, 14 Jun 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) But 
after the firestorm of support for Gusinsky from at home, and surprisingly from 
abroad- namely the US, Putin said on the 16th that the Prosecutor General's 
Office had gone too far: "I think it should've been possible to handle this without 
an arrest." He stressed, though, that Gusinsky was under scrutiny for his 
business dealings and not for his chairing of a major opposition media holding. 
He denied any political aspects to the case. (MOSCOW TIMES, 16 Jun 00; via 
www.themoscowtimes.com) And sure enough, as was the case with the Babitsky 
affair in February-March, Gusinsky was freed on the 17th after promising that he 
would not leave Moscow before the case comes to trial. (MOSCOW TIMES, 17 
Jun 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) This is far from over for Gusinsky, and 
the intentions of Putin and the administration are ominous (see the Executive 
Branch section of this NIS Observed) 
 
Gusinsky: for better or for worse 
Gusinsky is no angel- he is an oligarch, and much of what MOST holds was 
gained in shady, deals during the mid `90s, as was just about every other major 
business in Russia today. It is not unlikely that some of the charges against him 
are based in reality.He played the game of influence in the Kremlin against 
Berezovsky, clashing in media wars with Berezovsky's outlets when he bet on 
Fatherland-All Russia and Yabloko in the December Duma elections, and 
Yavlinsky in the Presidential elections. Gusinsky lost that game, as we've seen 
all spring.  
 
Hardly an idealistic champion of free speech, he is a default champion of the 
press right now, as his outlets have been (relatively) objective and the most 
critical of Kremlin policy in the last few years. NTV, Segodnya newpaper, Itogi, 
and the outlets that MOST has supported in the past, such as Novaya gazeta, 
are the last line of defense against the end of the free Russian press. No other 
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outlets in Russia have even remotely the reach that these enjoy, nor the editorial 
freedom. If Gusinsky goes down, as `dirty' as he may, MOST will likely be 
`redistributed' and Russia will lose its only viable. The `evil empire' has fallen, but 
if what began with glasnost dies, what will take its place? 
 
Has Berezovsky declared war on Putin? 
In Nezavisimaya gazeta on 18 May, an article was published that told us "not to 
confuse action against tycoons with threats to civil liberties." It told us that though 
it is a myth that Putin "is a weak president and a weak person," the writer has to 
admit "that the people who advocate this point of view, both in public and off the 
record, do have something to base their opinion on." It then presented a damning 
laundry list of ways that Putin has fallen short. (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 May 00, 
pp. 1, 3; Agency WPS- What the papers Say, via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
In Kommersant on 25 May, an article was written that told us that the 
Commission for European Security and Cooperation wrote that "under Putin, the 
human rights situation in Russia has deteriorated." It listed ways in which the 
commission found this to be so. It stated that members of the US Congress 
wanted Clinton to raise the issue of free speech when he visited Moscow, "even 
if Putin doesn't find this issue to his liking." (Kommersant, 25 May 00, p. 2; 
Agency WPS; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
So what's strange about this? Many opposition papers in Russia have been 
saying this for months. What's different is that both Kommersant and 
Nezavisimaya gazeta are Berezovsky papers. The man is clearly increasingly 
hostile to Putin, and we can trace this progression from his statements made just 
before the election to today. Of note- Berezovsky does not lose a tear that 
Gusinsky is in trouble, but condemns the fact that he was arrested and tossed 
into prison. Berezovsky is playing all of his cards, trying to discredit Putin and 
keep him from consolidating any strength. Surely, he sees himself potentially in 
Gusinsky's position. But in Russia today, Berezovsky is a name that the public 
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finds vastly more onerous than Putin, and the public seems to have largely 
supported- or acquiesed to- Putin's moves thus far.  
 
So perhaps Putin is allowing Berezovsky to dig his own trap. We'll know for sure 
if sometimes in the near future, Putin replaces or discredits a member of the 
Berezovsky entourage in the Kremlin. And if that happens, we can be sure to 
hear far less `veiled' protests from the Berezovsky media. 
 
May I see your license and registration please... 
...because your newspaper was telling treasonous lies about the state in a no-
dissidence lane of the information superhighway. On 10 June, Press Minister 
Mikhail Leslin declared that his ministry had reversed its policy and decided to 
uphold a 1998 law passed by the Duma that requires any publishing activity to be 
licensed by the state. To this point, the Press Ministry has upheld an earlier law 
that only required registration of newspapers and magazines. "If one strictly 
follows the letter of the law, we could have shut you all down a long time ago," he 
said in an interview by Obshchaya gazeta.  
 
According to Leslin, a court decision is required to take away a license, but the 
Ministry can suspend a license for up to six months for the violation of any media 
law. Publishing in the mass media without a license is, under this law, a federal 
crime. However, the Ministry is likely to interpret media law at its convenience as 
is normal government practice, calling hostile media outlets criminals for 
technicalities others get away with. 
 
Leslin even blamed the media for not following the 1998 law voluntarily, which 
`forced the Ministry's hand.' Noted Leslin, "But we don't want to take tough 
measures against violators, while the majority of print media are today among the 
violators." He lamented that he had "to make up for eight years of the 
government's lack of a media policy." (MOSCOW TIMES 10 Jun 00; via 
www.themoscowtimes.com) 
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On the behalf of the Russian independent media, I rest my case. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
JUDICIARY 
Vladimir Ustinov confirmed as prosecutor-general 
Coming as a shock to no one, the Federation Council officially dismissed Yuriy 
Skuratov from his post as prosecutor-general at President Putin's request. In so 
doing the Council resolved the situation whereby Skuratov technically remained 
the country's chief prosecutor although he had been suspended from his duties 
by former president Boris Yel'tsin. Putin's popularity seems to be the reason for 
the Federation Council's change of heart. Soon after the upper house confirmed 
Putin's appointment of acting-prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov to the post of 
prosecutor-general. (INTERFAX, 0726 GMT, 17 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0517 
via World News Connection) 
 
Although the members of the Federation Council would have appointed anyone 
Putin threw at them, not everyone was pleased with the way in which the process 
was handled. Vladimir Fedotkin, chairman of the Ryazan Province Duma, 
proposed postponing the vote until June: "We don't even have the documents we 
should have," such as Ustinov's resume. But given the fact that they might not 
even be in office if Putin's proposals to revamp the Federation Council go 
through, the senators may be wanting not to unduly annoy the country's chief law 
enforcer. Anyway, as Chairman Yegor Stroyev reassured them, "he's right here 
in person; what else do we need to know about him?" . . . (IZVESTIA, 18 May 00, 
Vol. 52, No. 20; Pg. 18; via lexis-nexis) 
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So why the rush? It appears that Ustinov was not necessarily Putin's first choice.  
The day before Ustinov's confirmation, the Federation Council was discussing 
the candidacy of Petersburger Dmitry Kozak. At that point the senators seemed 
content with Putin's decision, but again, they would probably have voted for 
anyone Putin suggested. It was only the next morning that they found out that 
Kozak's candidacy had been withdrawn and replaced by Ustinov's.  
 
"According to Sevodnya's information, [Prime Minister] Mikhail Kasyanov had 
intended to dismiss Kozak as government chief of staff and replace him with the 
head of Kasyanov's own secretariat, Konstantin Merzlikin. Members of Putin's 
inner circle got the idea of nominating Kozak for prosecutor general in order to 
counterbalance the role of the Family, which had pushed for Kasyanov to 
become prime minister. The president, who knows Kozak well, supported the 
idea. ButAleksandr Voloshin, who has the Family's (and his own) interests at 
heart, decided otherwise. Why?  
 
"Back in Petersburg, Kozak earned a reputation as a pedantic stickler for the 
letter of the law. Voloshin had no guarantees that a man who wasn't close to the 
Family wouldn't start stirring up the Mabetex and Aeroflot corruption cases, which 
have been dying down. Ustinov, on the other hand, was a known quantity, 
already tested in both the Skuratov case and the 'high-profile cases.' According 
to our information, the Mabetex case will be closed any day now. Even though, 
as our sources at the Prosecutor General's Office say, it can't be closed officially, 
a 'creative approach is producing a solution to this problem.' . . .  
 
"In short, the Family is still safe. At least as long as the Prosecutor General's 
Office is headed by Vladimir Ustinov, who is indebted to the entire Kremlin and to 
Aleksandr Voloshin personally." (SEVODNYA, 18 May 00, via lexis-nexis) 
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This interesting analysis by Sevodnya, if true, suggests that the Yel'tsin "Family" 
still commands considerable influence in the Putin Administration and he is not 
yet his own man. 
 
REGIONS 
Putin reorganizes presidential representation in the regions 
President Putin has been busy trying to regain control over Russia's wayward 
regions. He began by establishing seven "federal districts" which, with the 
exception of the Volga District, coincide with the country's military districts. Each 
will be lead by a presidential representative who is supposed to coordinate the 
federal presence in each district's constituent regions. The president's present 
representatives in each of the individual regions would retain their posts and 
presumably report to the head of the federal district.  
 
The presidential decree creates the Central Federal District (capital Moscow), the 
North-West Federal District (capital St. Petersburg), the North Caucasus Federal 
District (capital Rostov-on-Don), the Volga Federal District (capital Nizhny 
Novgorod), the Ural Federal District (capital Yekaterinburg), the Siberian Federal 
District (capital Novosibirsk), and the Far Eastern Federal District (capital 
Khabarovsk).  
 
As might have been expected, these districts are becoming the basis for the 
reorganization of several layers of the Russian federal government. Recently the 
procurator-general has appointed procurators at the new district level. 
Prosecutor-general Vladimir Ustinov stressed that the newly appointed district 
prosecutors will not replace the regional ones. "We are just going to bring the 
central office nearer to the local structures," he said. (ITAR-TASS, 0744 GMT, 7 
Jun 00 ; FBIS-SOV-2000-0607, via World News Connection) 
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A centralized police presence will also be set up in each of the districts, 
ostensibly for the purpose of fighting organized crime. (ITAR-TASS, 0816 GMT, 7 
Jun 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0607, via World News Connection) Even the court 
system is taking advantage of the districts by establishing district-wide legal 
jurisdictions. (ITAR-TASS, 1220 GMT, 26 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0526, via 
World News Connection) 
 
It is hard to discern whether these districts will have any lasting effect on reigning 
in the regions, or whether they are simply another level of bureaucracy and yet 
another line-item in the meager Russian state budget. Since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Russian politicians have had a love affair with creating organizations. 
There have been discussions for a while about creating "super regions" of some 
fashion, often along the lines of the eight economic associations. It is therefore 
not too surprising that Putin finally made the discussion a reality. But his district 
representatives will have little power and so it is hard to know what they can or 
will do. For now it is enough for Putin's glowing admirers to point to this decree 
and claim that he is restoring order. The solution to Russia's problems does not 
lie in hobbling together yet another level of federal bureaucracy, it lies in the fair 
and unequivocal administration of the nation's laws - something that has eluded 
the Federation's leaders up to now. As the president of Ingushetia, Ruslan 
Aushev, pointed out, "What will the presidential envoy sitting, for instance, in 
Khabarovsk know about what is happening on the Kurils?" He added that he is 
100% sure he would not be flying to Rostov-on-Don - the capital of the North 
Caucasus Federal District - to ask the presidential representative his opinion. 
(INTERFAX, 1716 GMT, 17 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0517, via World News 
Connection) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY  
Putin makes a move on the Federation Council 
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Proclaiming that "Government has to work!", President Putin's address to the 
nation outlined his idea for revamping the membership in the Federation Council, 
and by extension, federal relations with the regions. 
 
Putin pointed to three areas of change he would like to see implemented: First, 
the membership of the upper house would change. No longer would the heads of 
the regions and the leaders of the regions' legislatures sit in the Federation 
Council. Instead, these same politicians would appoint someone to represent 
them in the Federation Council. The Russian Constitution states that the 
Federation Council is to be constituted by two representatives from each region 
one of which is to represent the executive branch in the region, and the other the 
legislative branch. It does not stipulate how this is to be accomplished. The 
present system of having the actual head of the regions and regional parliaments 
was instituted after the ratification of the Constitution. Putin believes that the 
heads of the regions and regional parliaments cannot possibly hold down both 
jobs and do each well, and so a permanent representative needs to be sent to 
Moscow to represent the regions. 
 
Second, Putin wishes to construct a mechanism for removing regional leaders 
from office and dissolving regional legislatures when laws in conflict with federal 
legislation are passed. The same procedure would also apply to regional leaders 
and lower levels of regional government. 
 
Third, regional leaders should also be able to remove elected officials below 
them. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 19 May 00; via lexis-nexis). 
 
The bills sailed through the Duma, but are now being discussed in the Federation 
Council. Some form of the bill will certainly pass, but the sticking point for the 
present membership is the retention of parliamentary immunity which they would 
be forced to forgo if their representatives were seated in the Federation Council 
instead of themselves personally. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR James Duke Jr. And Lt. Col. Jill Skelton 
 
Russia's European ABM proposal, a paper tiger 
On June 1st Russian President Vladimir Putin unexpectedly proposed a joint 
Russian-European ballistic missile defense system. Kremlin sources were later 
quoted to the effect that Putin's boost phase intercept proposal concerns "only 
non-strategic anti-ballistic missile systems designed for fighting non-strategic 
missiles." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 5 Jun 00) The proposal is even more surprising 
because Russia has belittled United States' concerns regarding proliferating 
technology of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction and has also 
called the rogue nation threat "virtual." The deeper one digs into the proposal, the 
more uninspired it. Lacking any technical merit, it would serve Russia's political 
interests and would not provide any tangible contribution to Western Europe's 
defense. 
 
Following Putin's announcement, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyeev 
presented another vaguely worded statement that was more suited to starting a 
debate than serving as a blueprint for European missile defense. First, he 
recommended joint expert consultations on the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and, if successful, a joint assessment of missile threats. If Russia 
and Europe decide there is a missile threat, then they would commence a joint 
assessment on the level of threat. Eventually, the group would draw up a joint 
concept of a pan-European non-strategic anti-ballistic missile system, and test 
the concept in joint exercises. (MOSCOW RIA, 1544 GMT, 11 Jun 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-0611, via World News Connection) Finally, after endless study and 
testing, a defense system may be fielded. The proposal forces all interested 
parties into exhaustive, fruitless discussions while producing mountains of 
useless paper. To date, Europe has been skeptical of United States concerns of 
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a rogue nation threat. It is doubtful their attitude will change working with Russia, 
particularly when Russia calls the threat "virtual." However, the proposal would 
give Europeans political cover to claim they are doing something about missile 
defense while they refuse to stomach increased defense budgets. Julio Castro 
Caldez, the Portuguese defense minister said, "I do not see how you can 
convince European partners to increase their budgets" to pay for a defensive 
system. "We don't have the money." (UPI, 8 Jun 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The proposal is part of a larger Russian goal to divest the United States of its link 
to European security and further Russia's power and prestige. In the Cold War, it 
was a classic Kremlin tactic, usually wielded with a heavy hand. Today, Mr. Putin 
only insists that Russia is a fellow European power and is primarily interested in 
preserving the current arms control framework. (NEW YORK TIMES, 11 Jun 00; 
via Primary Current News Service) Putin's proposal plays on European fears of 
the United States plan to field a national missile defense system. The current 
plan will not protect Europe, leading to concerns of a two tier system of security 
within NATO. In addition, Putin has openly stated that, if the US fields a 
nationwide missile defense system in violation of the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty, Russia will "tear up" all arms control agreements. Russia will 
parlay European fears of a new arms race into anti-U. S. sentiment, potentially 
driving a wedge between Europe and America.  
 
Russia's meaningless ballistic missile defense proposal serves Russia, not 
Western Europe. It is part of a diplomatic offensive to block U. S. plans for a 
nationwide missile defense system. 
 
The second ABM proposal 
The second element of Russia's plan for anti-missile defense is a boost phase 
intercept system. Russia says it is developing the new defensive system, 
designed to be placed near threat countries, that would protect Russian and 
American territory. (NEW YORK TIMES, 14 Jun 00; via Primary Current News 
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Service) Boost phase intercept describes ballistic missile destruction during its 
ascent phase. A missile is most vulnerable during this phase because it is 
emitting a hot plume of flame and the warhead has not separated from the 
missile, presenting a relatively large target. Destruction of the missile in the boost 
phase ensures the warhead will not reach its target. Missile destruction in the 
mid-course and terminal phases poses more difficult intercept problems. 
However, there are technical challenges to a boost phase intercept architecture. 
First, the defense requires more than just very fast interceptors. Sensors, 
coupled with a command and control system, must enable the decision maker 
quickly to distinguish a hostile missile from a commercial rocket. The time of 
boost phase is short, approximately three to five minutes. Therefore, when one 
accounts for determining Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) trajectory and 
interceptor flight time, an interceptor launch decision must be made in less than 
two minutes. Russia's ballistic missile defense proposal would emphasize joint 
operations. Decision by committee has no place in the time constrained ballistic 
missile defense scenario. Another technical challenge is developing a seeker to 
distinguish the missile from its plume of flame. Finally, the interceptor must be 
nimble enough to intercept an accelerating target. These issues do not render 
boost phase intercept architecture technically unfeasible. Commitment, time and 
copious amounts of money could solve these problems. 
 
There are also other challenges to Russia and America working together on 
missile defense. First, the two sides differ on the need for anti-missile systems. 
While Americans, believing the missile threat is inevitable, plan to rely on 
technology and diplomacy, Russia prefers to call the threat "virtual" while hiding 
under a "political umbrella" based on diplomacy. (WASHINGTON POST, 14 Jun 
00; via Primary Current News Service) Also, Russia believes their boost phase 
intercept system can be fielded in lieu of the proposed land based system. The 
U. S., on the other hand, insists an anti-missile system must be operational by 
2005 to counter the expected North Korean threat. Due to the technical 
challenges, a boost phase intercept system probably could not be fielded prior to 
 24 
2005, therefore the U. S. views boost phase as complimentary to its land based, 
mid-course phase intercept system. It is unclear if Russia's proposal would be 
ABM treaty compliant. 
 
Former intelligence officials recently voiced their concerns of Russian tactics on 
missile defense. For example, a popular notion among arms control advocates is 
the ABM treaty provided the cornerstone of strategic stability between the United 
States and the former Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union did not want to 
spend resources on offensive and defensive capabilities. By prohibiting 
development of nationwide missile defenses, the ABM treaty enabled the Soviet 
Union to pour resources into the development of offensive weapons such as 
nuclear tipped ICBM's. The Soviet goal was obviously not to limit strategic 
weapons, but to limit the United States in an area of its technological superiority. 
Shortly after the treaty was signed, the Soviets fielded the SS-18 and SS-19 
ICBM's, both with multiple warheads. Due to the broad public support for arms 
control, it would have been political suicide for the United States to withdraw from 
the ABM treaty. (DEFENSE DAILY, 6 Jun 00; via Primary Current News Service) 
In 1972, technology did not support a workable ballistic missile defense system. 
However, 28 years later, technology advances make effective ballistic missile 
defense a distinct possibility. Russia's refusal to consider any modifications to the 
ABM treaty constitutes a continuation of Cold War policy. Moscow prefers to 
spend scarce resources maintaining its nuclear arsenal, its justification as a great 
power. An anti-missile system would force Russia to divert resources towards 
devising countermeasures, such as decoys and multiple warheads. Russia is 
producing 10 single warhead Topol-M ICBM's per year, not enough to maintain 
even proposed START III levels of 1000 warheads. (NIS OBSERVED, 1 Nov 99) 
By default, Russia's warhead levels will decrease, therefore the arms race threat 
is groundless.  
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A serious effort to cooperate with the United States would be a reversal of 
current Russian policy. The proposal is part larger Russian goal to stop U. S. 
plans for a national missile defense system. 
 
LTC James Temple, USAF and LCDR Richard Miller, USN are inbound to 
replace LTC Jill Skelton and LCDR James Duke. LTC Skelton is enroute to the 
Air Force Staff at the Pentagon. LCDR Duke is enroute to USS GARY (FFG 51) 
for duty as Executive Officer. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
It's summit time, but stagnation all the same 
In the run-up to the 21 June CIS Heads of State Summit and Foreign and 
Defense Ministers' follow on meetings, the unrelenting rift in CIS relations looks 
larger than ever. In preparation for the summit, the only truly CIS-wide meeting 
occurred over a month beforehand at the 18-19 May Astana CIS Interior 
Ministers' Meeting. (ITAR-TASS, 0703 GMT, 18 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0518, 
via World News Connection) Although it appears that many of the CIS members 
will ratify Russia's pet project, the Anti-Terrorism Center, at the June summit, the 
issue of terrorism and the possible CIS reaction to it has become more 
contentious than ever over the past few weeks. While all the CIS members seem 
to agree on the importance of counter-terrorism measures the two poles within 
the CIS couldn't be more different. While the Russian-6 have banded together 
tightly against their perceived aggressors (see Central Asia below), the GUAM 
members have looked inward and westward for answers. 
 
Beginning with Presidential Spokesman Sergei Yastrzhemsky's late-May threat 
of force against Taleban-funded terrorists operating out of Afghanistan, the hard-
line Russia-6 approach to terrorism began to unfold. (INTERFAX, 0708 GMT, 24 
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May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0524, via World News Connection) Almost concurrent 
with this statement and Ministry of Defense statements on the practicality of 
preventative air strikes against terrorist groups on CIS borders, the Collective 
Security Treaty (CST) members plus Uzbekistan met in Minsk to give more teeth 
to CST Treaty, thereby making Yastrzhemsky's comments even more ominous. 
By all accounts it now looks as if the legal presence of elite Russian Alpha troops 
on CST members' soil in case of a "terrorist" action is a foregone conclusion. 
(INTERFAX, 1744 GMT, 24 May 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0524, via World News 
Connection) Even Uzbekistan, which is no longer a CST member, has embraced 
the possibility of Russian "assistance" in the face of a terrorist attack. As far as 
the practicality of such counter-measures, or even preventative strikes against a 
terrorist threat is concerned, the CST members take no time in pointing out the 
applicability of the two previous years' Shield of the Commonwealth exercises. 
Clearly drawing from NATO's Kosovo airstrikes, the CST scenario utilizes strictly 
air strikes so as to minimize CST damages.  
 
In contrast to the CST members' rather draconian rhetoric and posturing, GUAM 
members addressed their long-term outlook in May as well. If a venue can speak 
a thousand words, then GUAM has done it twice in as many years. (TURKISTAN 
NEWSLETTER, 17 May 00; via turkistan-n@nic.surfnet.nl) Much like their 
prominent if short-lived expansion at the NATO anniversary summit in 
Washington last spring, GUAM members used Washington again this May to 
display their westward tilt. Although this comes as no surprise, in contrast with 
the CST meetings back in the former USSR, the GUAM members' appeals to the 
US Congress for more attention seemed far more diplomatically correct. For 
GUAM, which still portrays itself as an economic and semi-strategic grouping, the 
emphasis of the trip was on promoting their image as the rational, democratic 
and westward leaning group. In fact, the ambassadors from all five GUUAM 
member states-Uzbekistan is still playing on both sides-told an RFE/RL seminar 
that they wished specifically to expand relations with the US. In an apparent jab 
against their CST rivals, the Georgian Ambassador stressed that GUUAM was 
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not an "artificial organization based on coercion" but a group of five countries 
with "common problems and threat perception." (17 May 00; via www.guuam.org) 
 
Given the events of the past month, the prospects for the upcoming CIS Summit 
on 21 June look undeniably bleak. Even if the Anti-Terrorism Center does pass, 
the CIS has yet to create either the administrative mechanisms for implementing 
it or appoint a head to guide it, despite the fact that it is scheduled to become 
operational the day after the summit. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
The right thing to do, politically expedient or both? 
Over the past year, something quite amazing has been going on between US 
and Ukrainian prosecutors. It is something that has generally been quite rare in 
US dealings with the states of the former Soviet Union. It is called cooperation.  
 
In February 1999, the United States detained former prime minister Pavlo 
Lazarenko and began investigating charges that he had laundered millions of 
dollars of illegally obtained Ukrainian money through US banks. By that time, 
Lazarenko had already been charged with money laundering and embezzlement 
in Ukraine and Switzerland, and had seen his diplomatic immunity stripped by the 
Ukrainian parliament. Soon after Lazarenko was arrested in the US -- as he was 
apparently attempting to flee the Ukrainian and Swiss warrants -- US and 
Ukrainian officials began working together to follow the money trail.  
 
On 5 March 1999, Ukrainian Prosecutor-General Mikhail Potebenko announced 
that his office had sent the United States "additional evidence" regarding the 
Lazarenko case. The documents showed, Potebenko said, that "the person in 
question . . . must be held responsible for crimes committed." (INTERFAX, 5 Mar 
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99; via lexis-nexis) By 23 November, the Deputy Prosecutor-General said that 
the case against Lazarenko was "measured in some two thousand volumes" and 
included "bank accounts checked by the prosecutor-general's offices of Ukraine, 
Switzerland and other countries, including quite exotic ones." (INTERFAX, 0941 
GMT, 23 Nov 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1123, via World News Connection) 
 
Now, after more than a year of investigation, a US federal grand jury has indicted 
Lazarenko on one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, seven 
counts of money laundering, and 23 counts of transportation of stolen property. A 
statement from the US Attorney's Office carried in The Kyiv Post said, "According 
to the charges, between 1994 and 1999 Mr. Lazarenko transferred approximately 
$114 million that he had corruptly and fraudulently received into bank and 
brokerage accounts in the United States." (KYIV POST, 9 June 00)  
 
This indictment would undoubtedly have been impossible without the cooperation 
of Ukrainian officials. Although those same officials are unhappy that Lazarenko 
was not immediately extradited to Ukraine for trial, they have chosen to support 
the US investigation instead of standing in its way. This fact is in marked 
contrast, of course, to the current US investigation into Russian money 
laundering through the Bank of New York (BoNY). Although Moscow police have 
raided several banks allegedly involved in the BoNY scandal, US "authorities" 
told Newsweek that "the Russians have not yet shared much of that evidence." 
(NEWSWEEK, 28 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) Days before that Newsweek report, 
Associated Press reporter Vladimir Isachenkov called on then-presidential 
candidate Vladimir Putin to allow "his law-enforcement agencies to share what 
they know . . .." (ASSOCIATED PRESS, PM Cycle, 21 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) 
The request apparently fell on deaf ears. (For additional background on the 
BoNY scandal, see NIS Observed, 16 May 00) 
 
Of course, there are several factors that make cooperation in the Lazarenko case 
easier than in the BoNY case. Lazarenko's status as an enemy of just about 
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everyone in Ukrainian politics has likely made it much easier for his former 
colleagues to work with US officials on the issue. In addition, the scandal 
appears to be much more limited in scope than in the Russian case. It is, 
therefore, easier to investigate, and -- most important -- less dangerous to 
prosecute. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Ukraine's actions in this matter 
appear to have held it in good stead. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma told 
reporters that the Lazarenko issue was discussed during his meeting with US 
President Bill Clinton. According to Kuchma, Clinton told him that the charges 
brought against Lazarenko will help "increase investors' confidence in Ukraine." 
(INTERFAX, 1542 GMT, 6 Jun 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0606, via WNC)  
 
So, while there is no question that corruption is rampant in Ukraine, at least in 
this case the country seems to be doing what needs to be done. Whether they 
are doing so because it is the right thing to do, or because the situation allows 
them to get rid of Lazarenko, will soon become clear. In Lazarenko's indictment, 
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko is named as someone who 
helped Lazarenko profit from his position. The indictment, quoted in the Financial 
Times, specifically alleges that "Lazarenko received money from companies 
owned or controlled by Ukrainian businesswoman Yulia Timoshenko [before her 
appointment] . . . in exchange for which Lazarenko exercised his official authority 
in favor of Timoshenko's companies." (FINANCIAL TIMES, 5 June 00) How 
Ukraine's politicians and law enforcement officials react to this news will 
demonstrate whether the country's leaders truly want to eliminate government 
corruption, or whether they only want to eliminate certain corrupt government 
officials.  
 
MOLDOVA 
Putin to the rescue . . . not 
For almost a month now, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe) has been gently suggesting that the promised Russian troop pullout 
from Moldova is not proceeding as it should. At a 6 June briefing in Chisinau, 
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William Hill, the head of the OSCE's mission in Moldova, said that he was 
"concerned" about the lack of progress being made on the troop withdrawal 
issue. Shortly after, Hill stated, "An overwhelming number of OSCE countries are 
seriously concerned over the lack of movement in the withdrawal process." 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 17 June 00) Hill reiterated the OSCE's desire to 
provide Russia with whatever monetary assistance it might need for the 
withdrawal -- up to 30 million dollars -- but said that the country needed to make 
a formal request for the money. It doesn't appear that this request will be coming 
any time soon, particularly when Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent visit to 
Moldova is considered. 
 
Although the OSCE and Moldovan government had been hoping that Putin's visit 
would result in the announcement of a concrete timetable for the withdrawal 
(which Russia has been promising to provide since the December Istanbul OSCE 
summit), this hope was characteristically in vain. Putin carefully avoided 
discussing the specifics of Russia's promises during that summit and instead 
reiterated his belief that Russia should be the guarantor of "stability" in the CIS 
region. He then formed a "state settlement commission" headed by that well-
known peace broker Yevgeny Primakov. While the Russian Kommersant Daily 
praised the appointment of this "peacemaker" who would "not allow any 
weakening of Russia's military presence in the remote areas of the former Soviet 
Empire," the OSCE response was muted, at best. (KOMMERSANT DAILY, as 
quoted in the RUSSIAN PRESS DIGEST, 20 June 00)  
 
Therefore, it now appears clearer than ever that Russia will miss its Istanbul 
Summit 2002 target date for removal of troops. It also appears clearer than ever 
that Russia does not feel the need to either explain itself or change its mode of 
operation. (For a detailed analysis of the results of the Istanbul Summit, see 
Behind the Breaking News, 1 December 99) 
 
Meanwhile . . . 
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At the same time that the OSCE was expressing its concern about the situation 
in Dneistr, Moldova was attempting to ease tensions between the central 
government and the country's other autonomous republic -- Gagauzia. Strains in 
the relationship between Gagauzia and the central authorities once again 
became apparent during the last week of May. At that time, the Moldovan 
parliament refused to exempt a shipment of diesel fuel from Turkey to the 
Gagauz Republic from the country's custom and excise taxes. The Popular 
Assembly [parliament] of Gagauzia then issued a statement threatening to 
demand the status of a "third equal partner," with Chisinau and Tiraspol. (IPR, 5 
June 00) The Assembly wrote, "The attempt to revise the constitutional law, 
infringements on the region's rights in matters of shaping its own budget, delays 
in passing state property located in the autonomy's territory into Gagauzia's 
ownership, . . . the refusal to exempt from paying excise duties and VAT on the 
importation of diesel fuel as humanitarian assistance from Turkey are elements 
of a purposeful policy of liquidating the autonomy -- the main achievement of the 
Gagauz people." (INFOTAG, 1705 GMT, 31 May 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The Moldova Parliament responded quickly to Gagauzia's threats, backing down 
and voting to exempt the fuel shipment from taxes and fees. Therefore, tensions 
seem to have been alleviated for the moment. The fact remains, however, that in 
both of these cases, as well as with the country's Bulgarian minority, the central 
government is largely powerless, able to give in to threats, but not to influence 
events in any way. While the situation has been stabilized for now, there is no 
question that it will not always remain so. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Chechnya 
A cog in the wheel 
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The Russian leadership would like to control Chechnya through a Chechen 
leader who has the support of his countrymen and is a political and religious 
moderate. Those considerations led the Russian leadership to support Aslan 
Maskhadov in the 1997 Chechen presidential elections. The same reasoning 
would suggest negotiations with him now, except for one small problem: He is 
the elected president and can not simply be appointed to serve as yet another 
administrator in a sprawling, corrupt, Russian bureaucracy. 
 
Not so for Chechnya's mufti, the spiritual leader of the official religious 
establishment who became the deputy, to the deputy, of a Russian general. As 
the head of Chechnya's provisional administration, Akhmad Kadyrov answers to 
the (still to be appointed) deputy to General Viktor Kazantsev, the presidential 
envoy for the North Caucasus. (Novoe Vremya, June 2000. WPS via Nexis)  
 
When confronted with evidence of abuse and discrimination against Chechens at 
a Nezavisimaya gazeta conference on May 26, at which I was present, the FSB 
spokesman General Zhadanovich explained that FSB policies can not be 
considered anti-Chechen because there are Chechens serving in the FSB. They 
are fighting "terrorism" and "banditism" along with members of other nationalities, 
he contended. At the same time, Zhdanovich rejected out of hand the idea of 
organizing a Chechen consultative assembly (which was mooted by pro-Moscow 
Chechens) on the grounds that such a body would be uncontrollable. "How do 
you guarantee that the other representatives will have reasonable positions?" he 
asked. The meaning of these comments is fairly clear: Its okay to have Chechens 
serve the state as long as they don't occupy an autonomous role. This kind of 
thinking constitutes the context for Kadyrov's appointment. 
 
It was no surprise when on June 8 Putin imposed direct presidential rule over 
Chechnya. Kadyrov's appointment, which came a few days later may contribute 
to the fragmentation of Chechen society, taking support away from the 
Maskhadov government. But for the time being, Kadyrov has his hands full 
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consolidating the pro-Moscow Chechens With the support of Putin's 
administration, in the form of repeated praise from the presidential spokesman 
Sergei Yastrezhembsky and the military commander in Chechnya Genadii 
Troshman, Kadyrov has overcome the initial opposition from the district level 
authorities, who were appointed by Nikolai Koshman, the outgoing governmental 
envoy. Kadyrov looked particularly vulnerable when he twice postponed taking 
up his arrival in Gudermes after a close associate, Imam Umar Idrisov, was 
murdered on June 16. Kadyrov finally assumed his duties on June 20 and on 
June 24 he was endorsed by 250 out of 470 Chechen imams.  
 
One of the chief attractions of the mufti for the Russian leadership is his 
principled stand against, "wahabism," which he has recently renewed, by calling 
for the abolition of the movement. Ironically, it is precisely the sort of cozy and 
subordinate relationship between the government and the religious leadership, 
seen in the Kadyrov appointment, that has compromised the official clergy deeply 
in the eyes of the public and laid the foundation for the spread of radical religious 
movements.  
 
In the absence of tangible improvements in the social situation in the republic 
there is little chance for success on the anti-wahabism front. With few, if any, 
administrative, financial or police powers, Kadyrov is unlikely to provide the 
protection or basic services the population so desperately needs. If Kadyrov is 
able to get his hands on the oil businesss he may at least establish some degree 
of independent financing, but at present he says he will rely on federal outlays. 
(His predecessor, Koshman, is embroiled in a dispute with the oil company 
Rosneft, having been accused of siphoning off oil to the black market. He in turn 
attributes the shortfall in oil revenue to the Finance Ministry. (AFP June 21, 2000 
and Vremya MN June 10, 2000)  
 
On the eve of his fourth mission in Chechnya, a Russian spetz-naz officer 
"Grisha," (not his real name), expressed grave doubts to me about Putin's 
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tendency to appoint military and security services personnel to administrative 
duties. "Everyone has his work," he argued " but if you make me the head of a 
collective farm, I will turn it into a concentration camp." When asked if he had 
rules of engagement to govern his behavior in the field he said that there were no 
formal rules. Still there are some common sense practices: Operating in the 
mountains, Russian and Chechen reconnaissance units will pass each other 
without incident. But woe to any civilians that get in Grisha's way in the 
attainment of a mission. Grisha, who considers himself ill suited to administrative 
work and professes to "have no moral code" is currently employed in arranging 
governmental structures in Chechnya. 
 
Can Kadyrov rein in the likes of Grisha? This is highly doubtful since at present 
he lacks the authority even to appoint his own deputies. (Vremya MN, June 24 
2000 via WPS via Nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Nicholas Burk 
 
As "Talibanized" activity escalates, Central Asia tilts to Moscow 
The Great Game appears to be in its final phase as the phenomenon of 
"Talibanization'' squeezes Western influence out of the region. The Central Asia 
States and Russia stand tall against this amorphous "terrorist" movement, which 
spans everything from the Taliban regime to Osama bin Laden to Chechen 
insurgents and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Tensions continue to 
escalate. The Taliban have pushed closer to the Uzbek border with anti-aircraft 
weapons and tanks in tow, promising to hold Central Asia responsible for any 
airstrikes against them. Kyrgyzstan is poised to repel another invasion of the IMU 
from Tajik territory, while last year's incursion mastermind, Juma Namangani, is 
taking refuge in Taliban-controlled territory. Perhaps the most bizarre microcosm 
of Talibanization was this month's revelation about a terrorism center in southern 
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Afghanistan. An epicenter of Wahhabi subversion, the center seeks to create an 
Islamist state in the Fergana Valley and China's Xinjiang Province, and carry out 
subversive activities into the depths of Central Asia (INTERFAX, 30 May 00, 
FBIS-SOV-00-0530, via World News Connection). Ironically, the West's position 
on terrorism in Central Asia makes it increasingly difficult to dislodge these states 
from Moscow's influence, while other CIS states (GUUAM) move in the opposite 
direction (See CIS section above).  
 
Certainly the US is in a difficult position to criticize any strikes against 
Afghanistan given Washington's unilateral missile attacks in 1998. And what of 
NATO-ally Turkey? This month Turkish officials discussed a Kazakh role in the 
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Foreign Minster Ismail Cem also asserted an interest to 
share information to help combat terrorism and promote an Afghan settlement 
with Kyrgyz officials (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 13 June 00, via lexis-nexis). 
Yet this is the same Kyrgyzstan which this month adopted Russian as an official 
language to help to bring it into the `"world community''. President Akaeyev has 
asserted that `"Russia was, is, and will remain our main strategic partner'' 
(INTERFAX, 6 May 00, FBIS-SOV-00-0506, via World News Connection).  
 
As for Kazakhstan, Astana lashed out at moderate Islamic nations including 
Egypt for exporting terrorism to Central Asia. It is not surprising that Turkish 
Minister Abdullah Cay warned his Kazakh counterpart of Putin's neo-Soviet 
designs on the region, which the Kazakh minister largely brushed aside (Anakara 
Anatolia in English, 30 May 00, FBIS-WEU-20000-0530, via World News 
Connection).  
 
Most startling is Uzbekistan, a linchpin of GUUAM and NATO's Partnership for 
Peace program, and staunch member of the Turkic world. After May's Putin-
Karimov summit, the Uzbek President stated what could become an inscription 
on the Great Game gravestone: ``There must be no doubt that our views fully 
coincide'' (Moscow ITAR-TASS, 19 May 00, FBIS-SOV-2000-0519, via World 
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News Connection). Putin declared that an ``arch of instability'' had risen in 
Central Asia, while Uzbek Defense Minister Yuri Agzamov asserted that he was 
pleased by Putin's declaration that Russia would come to Uzbekistan's aid 
should its territorial integrity be threatened.  
 
Add to this the fact that Gazprom will import 5 billion cubic meters of Uzbek gas 
to Russia over five years, and that the Duma will rule on a dramatic military 
cooperation pact between the two countries, and it seems as though Moscow 
has few stumbling blocks in Central Asia (INTERFAX, 18 May 00, FBIS-SOV-
2000-0518, via World News Connection). Does the Taliban regime have military 
reach to cause chaos on the Tajik or Uzbek borders? Are bin Ladin, the IMU, and 
Chechen insurgents brothers-in-arms, equipped to subvert the Central Asian 
states? These questions may be viewed as little more than issues for the future, 
with obtaining a lasting sphere of influence over its former Central Asian 
colonies. This must be kept in mind should the Taliban move against the Uzbek 
border or the IMU attempts another invasion of Kyrgyzstan. For Turkey and the 
West, the window of opportunity is closing quickly, thanks to "Talibanization." 
 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: the start of greater Chinese involvement? 
There are signs this month that relations between Bishkek, Astana, and Beijing 
are strengthening. For the Central Asian nations, China represents large export 
market, especially for Kazakh oil. Meanwhile, the PRC pursues an active 
engagement of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to strengthen its hold on the volatile 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Clamping down on any Uighur 
separatism and opening a prosperous return to the Silk Road is designed to 
defuse what has been traditionally a turbulent Northwest frontier for China. And, 
as indicated above, Talibanization has a tendency to bring states closer together. 
Since the end of the Cold War, China has been especially fearful of an Islamist 
bent to Uighur separatism. The occasional rumor that bin Ladin was planning a 
Uighur insurgency was an extreme example in the 1990's. At the same time, 
some Uighurs did obtain experience fighting against the Soviet Union in the 
 37 
Afghan War. Concern over Talibanized Uighurs is increasing. The Afghan-based 
terrorism center (see above) is being pitched by Russian intelligence as a series 
of stepping stones: first the Fergana Valley, then Xinjiang (BBC, 01 June 00, via 
lexis-nexis). But Central Asia (including Xinjiang) is not the only region where 
these subversive Uighurs are feared. There are indications that Islamist Uighur 
violence is on the upswing throughout China, and even Hong Kong has tightened 
up security at army barracks, government offices, and businesses after receiving 
tip-offs about looming attacks (SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, 04 June 00, via 
lexis-nexis).  
 
Kyrgyzstan has been more then willing to help its giant neighbor. On May 25, two 
Chinese government officials (both Uighurs) were gunned down in Bishkek, by 
what are believed to be Islamist Uighur terrorists. This can be seen as a tragedy 
and an embarrassment for Kyrgyzstan. Earlier in the month, Kyrgyz authorities 
convicted five terrorists who were accused of bombings in Osh in 1997. The five 
consisted of a bizarre rogue's gallery of three Uighurs, one Turkish 
ultranationalist "Grey Wolf", and a Karachay who was trained by bin Ladin 
henchman Khattab in Chechnya (BBC, May 29, 00, via lexis-nexis). Bishkek and 
Beijing further cemented their firm ties after a June 2 high level meeting between 
Kyrgyz Defense Minister Esen Topoyev and Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao. 
Both leaders agreed to increase cooperation at all levels, including military-to 
military contacts (ITAR-TASS, 1 June 00, FBIS-SOV-2000-0601, via World News 
Connection).  
 
Kazakhstan also has a role to play in clamping down on Islamist Uighurs, but it is 
also instrumental in providing the oil which could stimulate needed development 
in Xinjiang. Caspian oil tends to elicit extreme feelings of despair or euphoria. Not 
surprisingly, the discovery of potentially vast oil finds in the Kazakh sector of the 
Caspian Basin this month evoked the following declaration from Prime Minister 
Tokayev: ``if this is confirmed, we can count Kazakhstan among the world's 
leading oil powers'' (INTERFAX, 12 May 00, FBIS-SOV-2000-0512, via World 
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News Connection). This could be very important for China. The chief of 
Kazakhstan's national oil transport company has suggested that China is 
Kazakhstan's most lucrative market for export, given that there is less 
competition over pipeline to the east than routes to the Black Sea, 
Mediterranean, or Persian Gulf. Astana is eagerly eyeing a deal to send oil to 
China in a joint venture with Gazprom. This month, Kazakhstan also formalized 
agreements with Beijing clarifying territories on the Kazakh-Kyrgyz-Chinese 
border, and also steps to safeguard Chinese and Kazakhs living in each other's 
territory (BBC, 18 May 00, via Lexis-Nexis, and BBC, 21 May 00, via lexis-nexis). 
 
China's engagement of Central Asia should take the spotlight at the Shanghai 
Five summit in Dushanbe on July 5. This group, consisting of Russia, China, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, plans to increase "confidence building 
measures" on borders and jointly "combat terrorism and religious extremism." 
With Kyrgyzstan capable of surpassing Islamist Uighurs and Kazakhstan holding 
a its petroleum trump card, this may be the beginning of a more vigorous China 
in Central Asia. Shanghai Five's drive to stamp out regional terrorism could 
introduce a more assertive Beijing, still seeking to stabilize and develop its 
turbulent Northwest periphery. Such a China would be an augmenting, not a 
conflicting force in the Russian/Central Asian drive to crusade against "Islamicist 
terror." 
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